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Abstract
Nowadays, we are increasingly logging on many different Internet
sites to access private data like emails or photos remotely stored in
the clouds. This makes us all the more concerned with digital identity
theft and passwords being stolen either by key loggers or shoulder-
surfing attacks. Quite surprisingly, the current bottleneck of com-
puter security when logging for authentication is the User Interface
(UI): How can we enter safely secret passwords when concealed spy
cameras or key loggers may be recording the login session? Logging
safely requires to design a secure Human Computer Interface (HCI)
robust to those attacks. We describe a novel method and system based
on entering secret ID passwords by means of associative secret UI pass-
words that provides zero-knowledge to observers. We demonstrate the
principles using a color Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) login
system and describes its various extensions.
Keywords: HCI, password, PIN, shoulder-surfing attack, key logger, one
time password.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, we are logging more and more to cloud services using Internet
terminal in public spaces with the threat of passwords being stolen. Stealing
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passwords can be done either by machine key and mouse loggers or by human
shoulder-surfing attacks. Purloining passwords often opens the door to iden-
tity theft. The threat is even more important as concealed spy or surveillance
digital cameras may be recording the login session, and later computer vision
techniques may be used to recover the secret password. Wired magazine had
in December 2012 its cover page entitled kill the P@55W0rD to emphasize
on the emergency of rethinking the password protection systems. There is a
strong need not only to rethink passwords [1] but also to reconsider the User
Interface (UI) to input safely passwords. This is an important Human Com-
puter Interface (HCI) problem that is gaining more and more attention with
dedicated conferences like the Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security
(SOUPS).
Ideally, we should not need to log in as the machine should recognize the
unique “Me” as sophisticated computer HAL 9000 did in Kubrick’s film
2001: A Space Odyssey (1968). That is, ultimately, it is not the user who
shall authenticate oneself but the machine who shall authenticate the user,
securely. Although artificial intelligence has made significant progress since
that 1960’s movie release, we are yet far from such a robust non-invasive bio-
metric system.1 Brain machine interfaces for logging have also recently been
considered [2] with the hope, one day, of ditching pass-words and replace
them with “pass-thoughts.” (Section 4 shall review prior work.)
Thus we ask ourselves what would be a secure UI system to log in public
spaces in front of other people using possibly a machine with unprotected
and readable input/output interfaces (I/O)? One solution is to use a One
Time Password2 (OTP) physical token device that is assumed to belong pri-
vately to the user. Each time the user logs in, it asks the token for a newly
on-demand generated password (e.g., typically by pushing a button on the
physical token). However, this device may be inadvertently stolen or, even
worse, some OTPs maybe generated by an attacker without stealing the de-
vice. The latter case is far more difficult to detect for the user that has
assumed to always securely carry the device!
Notice that passwords should never be stored plainly on servers. This has
dramatic consequences when servers are cracked, but unfortunately hap-
pens quite often as reported in the news. UNIX login program stores en-
crypted passwords either plainly in /etc/passwd file or in a privileged-access
1Current biometric systems include 3D head scan for example.
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_password
2
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Snapshots of the system: The moveable 3× 3 cursor letter board
is displayed on top of the fixed digit keyboard. To simulate the 2D torus
topology of the cursor keyboard, we display 3 × 3 translated (Euclidean)
copies (b) of the letter cursor board with offset the board dimension, and
clip the rendering to the fixed digit keyboard (a).
/etc/shadow file. It uses the user password as the key to cypher iteratively
25 times the 64-bit 0 string using the crypt() DES. To strengthen even more
the password a 2-character “salt” is generally added [4].
Our proposed system, called Color PINs, is based on using an associate UI
password for entering safely a secret ID password. The system only requires
to have a secure login software (e.g., signed with a cryptographic key for
avoiding Trojan attacks) and a random generator.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the UI login system and
explain its fundamental principles. It is followed by Section 3 that presents
some of its extensions. Finally, Section 4 reviews prior work and discusses
on several perspectives.
2 The color PIN system
We propose a simple technique to login using a public login name based
on two associated passwords instead of the traditional single secret password
scheme. Since it is easy to record insidiously keyboard key strokes, our
logging system uses a graphics keyboard and a cursor board User Interface
(UI).
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2.1 Description of the basic system
Once a user enters his/her login name, the system receives a UI password.
The UI password can be defined and kept secret by the user beforehand, or
generated on-line using the user profile as described later in Section 3.3. On
the graphical screen, we display a fixed key board and allows interaction using
a second moveable cursor board of identical dimension. This is a two-layered
display. For example, the fixed keyboard can be a 3×3 array3 of digits labeled
from 1 to 9, and the cursor board can be a 3× 3 array of letters labeled from
A to H. Let n = 9 denote the number of keys. The moveable cursor board is
controlled with a mouse or touch panel finger interaction. To enter his/her
secret password, the user needs to align (a task performed in his/her brain)
the cursor key with the corresponding digit key and confirm that input using a
mouse click or double finger tap event, for example. The mouse cursor of the
operating system is preferably hidden, but this is not a strict requirement.
The moveable cursor array, which is controlled by interaction, overlays on
the fixed digit keyboard and warps on the fixed board edges to implement
the 2D torus topology. This is depicted in Figure 1. Furthermore, to scroll
endlessly with the 2D torus topology, we implement screen edge warping of
the OS mouse cursor. Notice that in practice, it is enough to display 3 × 3
translated copies of the moveable cursor board with offsets the dimension
of the board, as depicted in Figure 1. There is no way for an observing
intruder to detect which key is aligned with which cursor as all pairs are
visually matching. Only the user and the logging system know which key
digit-letter pair shall be selected when input validation is triggered. Thus
an observer needs to memorize the n potential pairs at each step if he/she
wants to break the password. For passwords of length k, this ends up with
an exponential number, nk combinations, of potential passwords to test to
crack the user secret password. Each time the user enters a key, an asterisk
is displayed to notify the event and both the fixed key and the moveable
cursor boards are randomly shuffled, thus yielding no correlation for the
next digit-letter alignment task. Users can reset or validate the last entered
key using either mouse middle or right clicks, or by touching the screen at
virtual reset/validate button locations.
To further be resistant to mouse logger that could record and replay later the
3For sake of simplicity, we choose 2D arrays in this presentation as we are usually
accustomed with this numeric pad layout. However, the array can also be 1D (linear), or
even 3D (volumetric) if one wishes.
4
3141 3141
CAHB CAHB
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Figure 2: Login session for the associative password system using a 3×3 fixed
digit board with a 3× 3 moveable letter cursor. The user enters sequentially
the password 3141 using the UI password CAHB. After each digit input is
confirmed by a mouse click, both boards are randomly shuffled.
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mouse events, we choose the origin of the moveable cursor pointer randomly
inside the fixed board. This origin is used when displaying the UI controlled
moveable cursor.
Notice that instead of displaying the full moveable cursor board with n keys
on top of the fixed graphics board, it is enough to display at least l ≥ 2
of them including the correct associative key in order to get an exponential
number, lk, of potential combinations.
Figure 2 depicts the screen captures of a session for a fixed digit-moveable
3×3 letter board implementation of the system: The user enters the ID digit
password 3141 using the associated UI letter password CAHB. Note that after
each digit is entered by mouse clicking both the digit and letter boards are
shuffled randomly.
Figure 3 shows a similar system using a fixed board with a moveable color
cursor board. The layout is 2 × 5 with the following moveable color cursor
board:
BLACK ORANGE LIGHTGRAY RED BLUE
GREEN PURPLE AQUA OLIVE GRAY
The digits are colored with their respective cursor color currently covering
the digit key. The secret password is 31413 and that password should be
entered with the following color cursor combination:
Color cursor (UI PWD) Digit cursor (ID PWD)
LIGHTGRAY 3
GREEN 1
RED 4
ORANGE 1
LIGHTGRAY 3
Using the same secret ID and UI passwords at several login sessions weakens
the security. Indeed, if no shuffling of the digit and/or cursor board is done,
then recording, say, at the first position of the ’1’ digit the color sequence will
provide the password information to observers. When shuffling (at least one
of the two boards), we make different permutations of digits-color cursors.
However, video recording several login sessions and analyzing the common
matching digit-color pairs will provide information on the passwords. Thus
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Figure 3: The Color PIN system using a 2 × 5 color layout. The digits are
colored with the corresponding matching cursor color.
we should ideally change the UI password after at each session. This can be
done by using a OTP token device for generating UI password keys. The
user then keeps his/her secret password and generate a UI password when
logging. The advantage of the color PIN system over the traditional OTP
token device is that even if the physical token is stolen then it does not allow
to properly log in as the ID password is not compromised.
2.2 Implementation details
The color PIN system has been implemented using the Processing language
(processing.org), version 2.0b8. Wrapping the cursor operating system on
the screen edges (for endless smooth toric motion) is done using by using
JavaTM Robot class and mouseMove function.
3 Some extensions of the color PINs system
We present several extensions of the associative PIN code system.
3.1 Using legacy password systems
We can use legacy systems based on a single PIN by decomposing it into two
parts. For sake of simplicity, consider the pin size of even length 2k. Then
the first k digits of the PIN are used for the traditional ID password and
the last k digits are used for the UI password with the mapping 1 → A, ...,
9→ H when considering digit-letter boards, or 1→ BLACK, ..., 9→ GRAY
when considering digit-color boards. Thus we can enter a password of length
2k on legacy system using only k association pairs. For example, the PIN
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Figure 4: Snapshots of the login system using different rendering styles for
the moveable cursor board: (left) color boxes and (right) icons.
1234 is entered using C and D cursors aligned to keys 1 and 2, respectively
(or using LIGHTGRAY and RED color cursors). Note that by doing so,
we weaken the security as we have nk potential combinations instead of n2k
in a login session. In general, we can create a secure password including
the UI password by juxtaposing the two parts: ID PIN + UI PIN . The UI
PIN may be shorter than the PIN. For example, we can use letter ’A’ cursor
to enter the full PIN. When the UI PIN is shorter than the ID PIN (e.g.,
1234AB), we choose the current cursor cursor using the modulo operator
(here, ’1’ and ’3’ should be entered using ’A’ and ’3’ and ’4’ using ’B’).
3.2 Graphics board skins
To make the system more general, we just need to define two boards of
n elements: the fixed board elements F1, ..., Fn and the moveable cursor
board elements M1, ...,Mn. Those elements are numbered with function N(·)
universally using numbers 1, ..., n: N(Fi) = N(Mi). This allows for various
rendering styles. For example, we can use vacation images[3] for the fixed
board and numbers for the cursor board, etc. We can use icon sets or color
box sets as two different rendering styles for the moveable cursor array as
depicted in Figure 4.
Instead of using 2D graphics boards, 1D layouts of fixed and moveable boards
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may be preferred for, say, personal picture browsing, and require less graphics
space to display for a login session. Thus this kind of ribbon user interface
maybe appropriate to display at the bottom of other software when logging is
required. We may also add visual effects: For example, we may have a color
PIN to memorize, and have the color cursor rolling overs the digits. Each time
the color is on the digit key, all digits are colored with their corresponding
colors (as shown in Figure 3). Indeed, Human tend to memorize visual
objects rather easily compared to juxtaposed ID-UI associated PINs. The
moveable cursor may be textured (like bark, grass, or street road textures)
and the digits textured with the corresponding highlighted texture cursor.
3.3 UI password generation based on user profile
To help user memorize the UI password and generate many UI pass-
words, we define a user profile by asking a set of k questions, each with
n choices like what is her favorite food, favorite place, favorite color, fa-
vorite celebrity, favorite movie, favorite music, etc. Each time the user
enters a key, the moveable cursor skin changes to the next mode (e.g.,
food→place→color→celebrity→movie→music, etc.). Furthermore, for k-
length passwords, we generate a random permutation on the question orders
(yielding k! UI passwords) so that the user knows which moveable cursor
shall be used to enter the current ID PIN digit. This profiling frees users
from memorizing UI passwords but may be less secure when observers know
or guess his/her preferences.
3.4 Cursor control using another device
The moveable cursor board may be controlled using events sent from another
device. For example, a tablet or a game pad with a touch screen may be
used to send event relative displacement orders to the login application. The
orders can be absolute coordinates (rescaled to fit the display screen) or
relative motion orders encoding a translation. Note that in practice, it is
interesting to have a board display of relatively small size while providing a
large UI pad for precise interaction. This makes the input more precise for
users, say, on smart phones equipped with touch screens, where users can
touch anywhere on the screen for controlling the moveable cursor array on
the fixed board.
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4 Prior work and discussion
We first present prior work related to our color PIN system (see references
therein too): The CursorCamouflage [9] system displays a set of dummy
cursors that makes it difficult for observers to correlate with the user hand
motion. However, a careful video analysis of the recorded login session by
advanced computer vision techniques may decipher the secret key by analyz-
ing hand-mouse cursor correlations. In comparison, our color PIN system as
no dummy cursor but instead use two key boards and two PINs to identify
oneself. In [10], the authors present a shoulder-surfing resistant UI for enter-
ing password that uses pass-icons blended with other icons on a 2D layout;
The user is required to pass several challenges where each challenge asks to
click inside the convex hull of the pass icons. This system (like ours) does
not require to click on the pass icons. It is however more time consuming
and requires laymen to be familiar with the convex hull definition. In [7],
the authors describe cognitive trapdoor games where the users has two select
on which set the current PIN code digit is contained. After a few selections,
the system knows by “intersecting” the challenge subsets which digit was
entered, and proceed for entering the next digit, etc. One major drawback is
that it provides limited resilience when the session login is video-taped. The
closest work to our color PIN system may be found in [8].4 The FakeCursor
system manages a fixed secret and a disposal secret: He/She enters her pin
code by aligning the secret digit on the fixed disposal icons using left/right
ATM-like arrow buttons. We can interpret FakeCursor as a discrete UI work-
ing on the 1D ring topology. In comparison, our system is fully graphical as
it uses 2D torus topology and requires much less user input. Our system has
also higher-level abstraction as it requires to define two boards generically
that are associated using a universal numbering (see Section 3.2 on skins),
or uses a color UI OTP token device for entering the ID password.
The main drawback of the color PIN system is to require memorizing addi-
tional information: Namely, the UI password. Another potential threat is
by using gaze tracking and advanced computer vision, it might be possible
to guess which part were “intentionally” aligned by observing the user’ eyes
(a kind of computational mentalism). This risk is minimized by showing a
small board size. Interestingly, note that conversely, there are login systems
that have been designed based on eye gaze input [5].
4http://www.netaro.info/~zetaka/projects/fakePointer/index.html
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We have presented a login system that considers zero-knowledge UI for enter-
ing passwords. In perspective, instead of using the (parallel) visual percep-
tion system for entering a ID password, we could use tactons [6]: The shuf-
fled digits on the digit boards shall not be visually displayed, but tactilically
rendered using tactons, and the user shall press the corresponding tacton
corresponding to the secret PIN. This system is particularly well-suited for
visually impaired people.
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